The Battle of the Somme...


Page Two.....

The Battle of Messines was seen as a huge success by the British and morale among the troops soared. The week long preparatory bombardment had meant there was no effect of surprise whatsoever, but it was not necessary. It had been a meticulously planned attack in strength, using military intelligence and the first real strategy seen on the battlefield since the outbreak of war. By 12 June, the new positions having been consolidated, the men of the Ulster Division could worry about other things for a while. The 9th Fusiliers remained in camp to rest and 160 men were able to enjoy a bath during the morning. The Division stayed in the area for a further month, each brigade taking their turn on the front and then in reserve again, where training was continued. "Training carried on as per programme. Major Brew J G left Railhead, Bailleul for Aldershot, there to join Senior Officers' Infantry Course. He was struck off strength today." 

John George was to remain there a full three months, but on 7 July, while he was on his way back to England, the rest of the Division was moved back to St. Omer where they enjoyed a well-earned 12 days rest and were able to bathe in the warmth of the Summer sun. As always, divisional sports were a highlight of breaks behind the lines, and on 23 July a gymkhana was held at Acquin. The following day, the Division was moved north to Wizernes and came under the command of 19th Corps of the 5th Army. By the end of July, they were positioned between Watou and Poperinge, in earnest preparation for their next battle, a supporting roll in the imminent Third Battle of Ypres, an attempt to win the northern half on the Ypres Salient.

In France at the same time, following the failure of the French offensive at Champagne and it's horrendous losses, disgruntlement with leadership was mounting within French ranks which led to a wave of mutinies and desertions. Having emerged in the French 2nd Colonial Division in May, the contagious fervour soon affected 16 separate Corps. The barely 500 desertions of 1914 were eclipsed by over 21,000 in 1917. French troops maintained their willingness to defend their trenches but refused foolhardy attacks. They saw no sense in attacking impregnable enemy defences which in their eyes brought nothing but death and suffering. Although a change in French leadership was able to restore order, 23 soldiers were executed in its wake, and over 100 others deported to the colonies. French General Henri Pétain set about the difficult task of rebuilding confidence and strength, but by the end of the war, some 630 French soldiers had been sentenced to death for desertion. According to official French statistics, only 75 executions were actually carried out, but it is rumoured that many more were shot at and behind the front line in unofficial executions. Russia, too, had problems of her own attempting to counter the revolution which had broken out at home in March, and which was to culminate in her departure from the war in October. She had already ceased to be a major player and the situation had relieved Germany of much pressure on the Eastern Front.

With the problems of disgruntlement among the French forces and bickering between French and British commanders over leadership, the Allied war effort had been severely weakened. Despite the strength of British forces - some 64 divisions - the British commanders were under heavy pressure as they realised they would have to carry the weight of the remainder of 1917's offensives.

On 31 July, the opening day of the new Ypres offensive, sometimes referred to as "Passchendale", twelve divisions advanced along an 11 mile front, following almost ten days of intense artillery bombardment. Heavy rains began to fall that day and continued for many days into August. Aided by artillery barrages, the already muddy terrain was made impassable; advance against German pillboxes and wire was impossible. The Ypres Salient had already become synonymous with mud, blood and horror and this episode would be no different; many men sunk in the mire, drowned and disappeared, buried forever. Despite initial successes and land gains, hopes for a repeat of the quick success at Messines faded by the day. Infantry, tanks and artillery became bogged in the quagmire, and no substantial gains could be made. It was impossible to find justification for the extreme casualty figures.

For their part, the Ulster Division went into battle in support of the 55th Lancaster Division's attack, initially carrying supplies and clearing casualties, then moving into the front line just two days later to relieve them. But their major roll was to be in a component of the Ypres campaign which has become known as the Battle of Langemark, which commenced on 16 August.

Backed up the 5th Division, the 36th fought alongside the 16th Irish Division again as they had in Messines. On the Division's left flank was the 48th Division, while within Divisional lines, the 109th Brigade was on the left, the 108th on the right, and the 107th remained in reserve. The 9th Irish Fusiliers were positioned at Pommern Redoubt to the far right of the 108th Brigade lines. They advanced at 04:45 on a two company front, A and B followed by C and D, in the direction of Hill 35 with the 7th/8th Irish Fusiliers of the 16th Division on their right and the 13th Irish Rifles of their own Division on their left. Making excellent gains at first, in spite of the muddy conditions, considerable resistance was soon met. The German Artillery shortened it's range and C and D Companies suffered heavily. They struggled hard to take Hill 35 but found German wire mostly still in place and pill-boxes still operational. The advance was brought to a halt and the German guns began to concentrate on them, causing heavy casualties. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sommerville, was killed in action and the battalion was driven back. Other battalions of the Division made few gains despite their efforts. Many died in the German counter-barrage, which was followed up by a counter-attack with infantry and succeeded in pushing the British back to their starting line along the entire front.

That night, both the 108th and 109th Brigades were relieved by the 107th, which had remained in reserve, and withdrawn by bus to Winnizeele. The following evening, on the night of 17/18 August, the 107th was relieved by a brigade of the 61st Division and the Ulster Division was completely withdrawn from the Ypres front. The suffering was great, and once again the Division reported massive casualties. The 9th Irish Fusiliers alone reported 36 killed in action, 323 wounded, 12 cases of shell-shock, 83 missing, and 2 missing believed killed - a total of 456 men. Between 2 and 18 August, in just over two weeks, the Division as a whole had lost 144 officers and 3441 other ranks killed, wounded, gassed, and missing, about the equivalent of three whole battalions. But since the beginning of June, the Division's casualties amounted to a massive 205 officers and 4510 other ranks, accounting for approximately one in three men! Hardly surprising, the losses seriously effected the troops' morale.

After four days rest in Winnizeele, seriously under strength, the demoralised Division was sent by train back to the Somme, where memories were stirred of the great battle and the terrible defeat they had suffered there just over a year before. In the closing days of August, they detrained at Bapaume, a town which was still behind the lines at the time they had left, and took up position on the Hindenburg Line facing the town of Cambrai, to the north-east. Here, reinforcements joined the Ulstermen to bring them up to strength, though many of these were from mainland England; the "Ulster" in the Division's name was destined to slowly become an anachronism. Additionally, the 107th Brigade gained the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers, while the 8th and 9th Battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles were amalgamated. Within the 108th Brigade, the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers were bolstered by about 300 men of the now dismounted North Irish Horse, and the 11th and 13th Battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles were amalgamated, while two external battalions, the 7th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles and the 2nd Rifle Battalion, were amalgamated and posted to the 108th.

Having been on a senior officers training course for several months, John George Brew was fortunate enough to have missed the third Ypres campaign at Langemark. He returned to duty with the Ulster Division on 3 October and assumed 2nd in command of the 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers. By this time, preparations were well under way for the next offensive, at Cambrai. The Germans were still occupied on the Ypres Salient and would not be expecting any assault by the Allied forces before Winter. The strategists were gambling on this assumption to stage a surprise attack on the town. Part of the plan would be the first major tank attack in strength, which was to be followed by an immediate infantry assault. The aim was to overwhelm the enemy before he knew what was happening, with the intent of clearing the German Army from the entire Cambrai area. The 36th Division's goal would be to take the German trenches between the Bapaume-Cambrai road and the Canal du Nord. This would be the responsibility of the 109th Brigade while both 107th and 108th would remain in reserve for follow-up and mopping up in another part of the battle.

However, the German trenches on this front were different to those which the Ulstermen had encountered on the Somme and in Ypres. These were a part of the Hindenburg Line, to where the German Army had voluntarily fallen back during the previous March. They had been built at their own leisure with the aide of the forced labour of thousands of Russian Prisoners of War. Consisting of two great lines of wide, deep and solidly built trenches with deep dugouts, well fortified with pillboxes and several lines of wire, they presented a formidable obstacle.

Behind the front, British troops made practice attacks on dummy trenches built to resemble those which they would be assaulting, as they had done in preparation for the attack at Messines in June. Field Marshal Haig felt it was essential they knew what they were facing and, in the event their officers should fall, that his troops should know exactly what to do and how to carry on alone to achieve their objectives. Practice runs and briefings were repeated daily until all knew what was expected of them. Fortunately, the weather was good, and preparations were able to continue at high speed. Morning mists worked also to their advantage as many preparations could be undertaken in the proximity of the front line which might otherwise have been impossible. Roads were cleared, supply routes built, and the necessary equipment brought to the front and camouflaged. Tanks were brought forward and hidden in the forests; their tracks over open country, which would be visible to German reconnaissance aircraft under normal circumstances, were also well hidden by the fog. In the first two weeks of the month, the Division provided parties of between 200 - 600 soldiers each day for unloading ammunition from supply trains at Ytres Station. During this time, John George Brew took over temporary command of the 9th Fusiliers while the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel P. E. Kelly, took two weeks leave.

Nightly bombardment of German positions and supply roads was carried out to harass them and raids were made on their lines to check defences and gain intelligence information. One such raid, on the evening of 3 November, consisted of three parties from the 9th Irish Fusiliers, totalling together four officers and 67 other ranks. They made a large raid on German trenches to the south of the Hermies-Havrincourt road and east of the Canal du Nord. Passing through gaps in German wire, they stormed enemy positions and killed some 40 men, but with the loss to themselves of one killed, three missing believed killed, and 15 wounded.

On 18 November, the 9th Irish Fusiliers moved from Bertincourt back to Barastre, some 8 miles behind the front line where they spent the night with the rest of the 108th Brigade and paraded for a final inspection by the Commanding Officer the following morning. That afternoon, the eve of the offensive, they moved forward again at 16:30 to their start positions in Vélu Wood.

Next morning, under the cover of morning mist and without the customary artillery barrage announcing the beginning of an attack, 381 British tanks raced forward on a six mile front with supporting infantry. The surprise was complete as the Germans were quite obviously used to the habitual several days' advance warning by the artillery. "The Division (109th Brigade) moved to the attack at 6.20am, 107th and 108th Bdes. in support. Battalion "details" remain in Velu Wood under command of Major J.G. Brew."
As no tanks had been allotted to the Division's sector, and as no artillery was allowed prior to the attack, the job of the 109th was actually made that much more difficult. Machine Gunners were to move up with heavy Vickers machine guns and spray fire down the wide Hindenburg trenches, allowing accompanying troops to move up unhindered. The 9th Fusiliers remained in reserve during the morning but moved forward to a position 500 yards north-east of Vélu Wood two hours after the assault began.

The effect of surprise was, for all intents and purposes, a magnificent success; enemy wire, which would have stopped or slowed infantry, was flattened by the tanks. The infantry followed the tanks through and completed the 'mop-up' work, a time consuming and dangerous job as many Germans still hid in bunkers up to 30 feet below the surface. But, by the end of the first day, 5 miles had been gained, accounting for more than had been achieved in months of fighting in either the First Battle of the Somme or the Third Battle of Ypres. All three main lines of German trenches had been overrun, and the tanks were advancing into open country. Hundreds of Germans, stunned by the speed of the advance, were swiftly taken prisoner and herded back behind British lines.

The 109th attack also went well. Their first objectives were taken with relative ease. Many Germans were killed by machine-gun fire and 70 prisoners of the 20th Landwehr Division were taken, along with two machine guns. The advance continued down communication trenches, and guards were left behind by advancing battalions at the entrance to underground bunkers to await supporting troops who would complete their clearing, referred to as 'mopping up'. Once cleared of enemy troops, a dugout would be posted with a large sign clearly stating "MOPPED". The Brigade's first objective was reached a few minutes behind schedule, around 09:30, and soon began on stage two. With a hard push, the Brigade drove the enemy before them, and despite some at times strong resistance, the remainder of the German troops in their sector fled across the Canal. The 11th Inniskillings crossed the Cambrai-Bapaume road at around 15:30 that afternoon, and settled down to consolidate their position, having attained their set objective. By the end of the day, the 109th had managed to take 509 prisoners and, to their great pleasure, also captured a German stores depot. The 9th Irish Fusiliers, meanwhile, had moved forward at 13:30 in the afternoon to Broken Bridge and Yorkshire Bank, where they found overnight shelter in dugouts from the heavy rain which had begun to fall. Next day, the advance continued, and the 109th managed to reach the outskirts of Moeuvres. The Irish Fusiliers followed the 109th forward with the 108th's other three battalions, all the while remaining behind the advance which was continuing north of the Cambrai-Bapaume road. The Fusiliers reached old German lines near Lock 7, where they spent the night in dugouts recently occupied by German troops.

The Brigade was up early the following morning, 22 November, and set out at 06:30 for a position north of the Bapaume-Cambrai road. They arrived an hour later and prepared to relieve the 109th. At last they were to see some action. The Irish Fusiliers were planned for deployment in the attack on the village of Inchy, but it relied entirely on the success of the 12th Irish Rifles' attack on Moeuvres. The Fusiliers had to wait therefore in reserve for the order to finally begin their attack.

But by late afternoon it had become clear that the attack by the 12th Rifles had failed to decisively take the village; they had fought their way into it, but had been pushed back out again by a German counter-attack shortly before 18:00. Realising the gravity of the situation, the order was given that the 9th Fusiliers should disregard their previous objective and move forward to support them. At 20:30 they counter-attacked on the retaken village but they, too, failed and were forced to retire to their start trenches where they spent a cold, wet, and uneasy night.

It was soon clear the Germans had recovered from their original shock and had begun to organise counter measures. They changed their defensive position to the offensive and were counter-attacking in strength. The Allied advance was slowed and in some places stopped completely. Allied tank crews and their accompanying troops had begun to tire and the assault's fatal flaw suddenly became apparent; British strategists had failed to plan for reserves. The advantage could not capitalised upon and the new line could not be held. Now it was too late. By the time it was realised, it was impossible to bring reserves up fast enough to repel German attacks and consolidate on gains. The initiative fell to German commanders who only too happily exploited the opportunity.

At 10:30 next morning, with the support of the 2nd Irish Rifles, the 9th Irish Fusiliers and 12th Irish Rifles attacked Moeuvres anew, this time succeeding in taking most of the village. The joy was, however, extremely short lived as German troops counter-attacked again just before midday from trenches east of the village, and aggressive fighting continued throughout the afternoon. Although the attack was beaten back, the men were tiring, and, receiving no relief from further reinforcements, the battalions were forced to evacuate Moeuvres, and leave it to the Germans; by 17:00, they were once again back in their start trenches to the south-west of the town. That evening, the 9th Fusiliers reported one officer killed, six officers wounded and 82 casualties in the other ranks for the previous 48 hour s.

At dawn they were relieved by the 11th Inniskilling Fusiliers of the 109th Brigade, who had spent the previous day in reserve, and were withdrawn to Hermies, about four miles to the south, where they spent the following day resting. Snow had begun to fall and winds had risen making it very unpleasant to be out in, but in the evening the men were moved again a short distance, to Beaumetz-les-Cambrai, where they spent an extremely cold night in tents. The next day, they were moved six miles southwards, through Vélu and Bertincourt to Rocquigny, where they remained the next 48 hours. While there, many took the opportunity to bathe at last and take issue of a clean change of uniform, while others refitted and replaced damaged or lost equipment. Two days later, the Ulster Division was entrained at 20:30 at nearby Ytres, for Beaumetz-lés-Loges, south-west of Arras, for some rest. They arrived at 02:45 on 30 November and marched some 30 minutes to billets at Simencourt.

They had barely arrived, when, later that same day, news came through of an massive German counter-attack at Cambrai. The Germans had used the same strategy as the British had just used on them and attacked without advance warning by artillery barrage, overrunning the British before they realised what had happened. The German commanders had the added advantage of having reinforcements which had literally just arrived from the now defunct Eastern Front and were sent straight to the front; the British still had none. The Ulster Division, though weary, were immediately recalled to the front. Leaving Simencourt the same day at 14:30, the Division had to march back to Cambrai, there being no trains available to carry them.

On 3 December the 108th Brigade was placed under the command of the 61st Division and deployed in the Couillet valley the following day where they relieved the 88th Brigade. The following night, the 109th was moved forward and relieved 61st Division troops holding the front at Welsh Ridge. The Germans had already made enormous gains, taken thousands of British prisoners and hundreds of guns; bodies were lying everywhere along the front. Attack and repulse followed counter-attack and retreat for several days, but eventually the 109th drove the Germans off the ridge.

From 9-12 December, the 9th Fusiliers remained behind the front in support of the rest of 108th Brigade, and spent much of their time carrying wire to the front. At dusk on 12 December, the Fusiliers relieved the 2nd Irish Rifles on the front line on a three company front, with 'D' Company in support. In their sector in the valley, the 108th had less difficulty holding the line than the 109th. It seemed the German troops in the area merely wished to consolidate their position and re-establish posts in the sunken road there. Early on the morning of 13 December, however, the Battalion received information that they should expect an attack on their lines at 06:30. Already at 04:30 they captured a prisoner from the German 6th Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment, then stood to at 05:30 in advance of the expected assault, which never arrived.

Within a short time, further advance on either side had failed, the battle degenerated into a war of attrition. Aggressive German shelling continued on British rear areas both day and night, and German aeroplanes often strafed British trenches, causing many casualties in the Division. Casualties of war were indeed high, but the poor weather and the effects of three weeks exposure to the elements had also taken a great toll on the men. Their physical condition had become extremely poor. Not surprisingly, many had fallen ill and required extensive medical treatment. They were cold, wet, dirty and tired. General Nugent expressed his concerns to his Commanders, aided by a strongly worded medical report from the RAMC demanding some much needed rest for the Division. Finally, from 14-16 December, during heavy snowfall, the utterly exhausted men withdrew in stages, relieved by battalions and brigades of other divisions.

As they retired on 16 October, the 9th Irish Fusiliers spited the Germans with a last quick kick in the shins. At 17:00 they stormed a machine-gun post of the German 6th Reserve Infantry Regiment with mills bombs, bayoneted the gunner, drove the others into retreat, and captured the machine gun. At 21:00 they were finally able to retire when they were relived by the 7th Royal Fusiliers, and marched to Metz-le-Coutre in the rear.

Despite the final loss of the campaign, through one main flaw - lack of follow-up, the Allied Generals had gained valuable experience and learnt important lessons for future assaults. Assault without artillery had found new approval, and, snubbing sceptics, the tank had at last proved it's worthiness.

After a night in Metz, the Fusiliers were moved to Etricourt, where they were billeted in tents. On 18 December they were entrained at Etricourt for Mondicourt, but owing to heavy snow, the train did not arrive until midnight. Detraining was followed by a march through deep snow to billets in the village of Coullemont. Several days were spent in the area, and the men were kept busy clearing roads of snow, cleaning up, bathing and parading for inspections. Staunch Protestants, the spiritual well-being of the Ulstermen was as important to them as their physical well-being, and on Sunday morning, 23 December, they attended a church service held in the village of Humbercourt. Two days later, Christmas Day 1917, the men attended a divine service at 10:30, followed by company Christmas dinners that afternoon, each of which was visited by the Commanding Officer to say a few words. For many of the men, this was their third Christmas in France, and, although they were able to enjoy a peaceful Christmas away from the front, all hoped and prayed they would be home for the next one.

After the short pause for Christmas, the men were moved by rail from Coullemont to Boves, south-east of Amiens, and spent the final days of the year hard at work clearing snow, sandbagging, route-marching and parading, an agenda which also included kit inspections and musketry instruction and practice. The high hopes which began the year had bogged down in the mud of Belgium and France, additionally complicated by Russian and French internal problems. The problems in Russia were not to be underestimated; they undermined Allied morale and almost led them to the brink of defeat. Germany used Russia's weakness on the Eastern Front to her advantage and surged forward, driving Russian troops from their strongholds. Following a further putsch by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, when Lenin took power, Russia sued for peace and pulled out of the war, thus freeing German troops to strengthen their Western Front.

The second half of the year had seen limited gains by the French at Verdun and Chemin des Dames, and besides the success of Messines and the initial blow against the Germans in the ill-prepared Cambrai tank attack, there was not much to speak of in the way of Allied accomplishment or clear-cut victory in Europe that year to justify the excessive casualty figures; the 1917 Arras, Ypres and Cambrai campaigns alone had cost the British some 420,000 casualties. The war was at a stalemate and no-one knew how much longer it would continue. Britain had now been at war for over 3 years. The troops were tired. They were sick of the mud and wet feet, and fed up with the monotony of rations and life in the trenches. But in typical British fashion, soldiers poked fun at the things which irked them. One man wrote a rhyme for the "B.E.F. Times",

"Sing a song of Christmas!
Pockets full of slush,
Four and twenty P.B.I.
A dixey full of "mush",
When that dixey opened
The Tommie's said "Oh my!
It's beef today by way of change"
And they began to cry."

Everyone held out hopes that the new year would finally see the end of it all. But for Allied commanders and strategists at this time, there was still a major and very serious reason for concern. Since October 1917, the number of Allied infantry divisions on the Western Front had not increased. On the contrary, it had fallen by seven, while the existing Divisions were on average 2000 men under normal strength. All the while, German troop numbers had steadily increased, nourished by train-loads arriving from the now defunct Russian front. Allied commanders were justifiably becoming increasingly worried as they realised the Allied advantage in numbers was dwindling by the day. Between the end of October and the end of December, the number of German divisions on the front had risen by over 20 and more were on their way. For the Allies, large numbers of American troops were still months off, and by early 1918, it had become quite apparent that the Germans now held the upper hand.

The first six days of the new year were spent by the 9th Irish Fusiliers in Boves undergoing training, but on 7 January they were on the move again. A 14km march that day, along a snow-covered route to Marcelcave, was followed on ensuing days by an 11km march to Rosières, north-west of Roye, and a 15km march to Carrépuis, east of Roye, where they arrived on 11 January. Two days later they marched a further 20km to Villeselve, south-west of St. Quentin, where the Division's 107th and 109th Brigades immediately moved forward to relieve the French 6th Division, while the 108th remained in reserve. During these movements, Divisional Headquarters was established in Nesle, but was promptly relocated to Ollézy on 14 January.

A final move of 13km northwards from Villeselve to Seraucourt-le-Grand (Grand Seraucourt) on 17 January positioned the 9th Irish Fusiliers just a short distance from the front. The length of the British front line had just been extended further south, and troops of the 107th and 109th Brigades were now occupying trenches recently held by French troops around the southern side of St. Quentin. The trenches in the Division's responsibility ran the length of some 6000 yards, between Sphinx Wood and the St. Quentin-Roisel railway line. Meanwhile, troops of the 108th Brigade were billeted in villages along the St. Quentin-Ham road, and Brigade Headquarters were set up just east of Ham in Dury. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' strength in the third week of January is recorded as being 39 officers, 866 other ranks, 39 horses and 16 mules.

The Germans realised the French and been relieved and soon sent several raiding parties into the Division's lines to find out by whom. They succeeded in taking several prisoners of the 107th and 109th Brigades during the night of 22 January and obtained the answer. However, besides these small incidents, life seemed very quiet in the sector, one of the most easterly reaches of the Allied Somme front. Besides their main occupation during the latter half of January of digging trenches and improving existing ones, there was also time left for more enjoyable pastimes. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary gives us a clue: "2 p.m. Beat 16 R.Ir.R. at football, 5 goals to 1."

The Ulster Division also took the opportunity to reorganise and bring in reinforcements to replace the devastating losses which Cambrai had inflicted. The 107th Brigade now consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 15th Royal Irish Rifles, the 108th consisted of the 12th Royal Irish Rifles and 1st and 9th Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the 109th became the 1st, 2nd, and 9th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. With it's usual touch of tongue-in-cheek sarcasm, the editorial of the January 1918 edition of the "B.E.F. Times" gives us an impression of the sentiments of the average British soldier as the new year dawned. For the first time, it offered the encouraging expectation that 1918 would, at last, be the final year of the war - actually quite a pretentious prognosis for the situation the British Armies were now in.

1918

'Seconds out of the Ring. Last round coming up.' ....Up to now the luck has generally been with the Huns, but it looks as if we are going to leave them in the New Year. Anyway, we strongly advise Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Douglas Haig to get up and walk round their chairs three times. The sight of Winter's mantle always makes us feel poetic, but the thought of the future when the damned stuff melts restrains any rhapsodies on the subject. We have heard so many tales from the Hun about what he's going to do to us now that he has fixed Russia, that it makes us think he is trying to forget what WE are going to do to HIM. It is still our firm opinion that any Hun could be bought for a tin of bully and a slice of bread. Anyway, we feel inclined to get mixed up with the prophets Elijah, John the Baptist and Horatio Bottomly, and prophecy the general bust up of the Hun and no very remote date, say September next, provided all pull their weight. This proviso is necessary, and does not apply only to those not in khaki. So, here's to 1918, a speedy finish and a job well done. Here's the best of luck to you all in the New Year, and a quiet thought and salutation to the memory of those stout lads who left us in the old." Quite prophetic indeed, but far too early to start celebrating; much was to occur between the new year and the end, when it finally came.

By the end of January, the 9th Irish Fusiliers had taken up position on the right sector of the Division's front line, where they had relieved the 14th Irish Rifles, and found the trenches in a poor state, having fallen in, in some places. Their War Diary notes that wire was plentiful and that the average distance between their trench and the German front line averaged 1000 yards. There was no lack of activity during their spell in the line; the men were sometimes bombed by enemy aircraft during the night, or came under artillery fire during the day. "5.30 a.m. German shot about 50 yds. in front of "A" Coy. He belongs to 5th Grenadier Regt. 36th Div. 2 - 4 p.m. Bn. and Coy. Headquarters. were fired on with 105mms."

Maj. John George Brew once again took temporary command of the Battalion during the latter half of January, while Lieut.-Colonel Kelly took leave. John George took responsibility for the Battalion War Diary for January, and undersigned it at the end of the month.

But this time, the mood among British troops had begun to become unsettled, as, like during the still before a storm, they were wary that something was brewing. During the first 10 days of February there was a marked increase of German artillery activity. British lines were suffering regular barrages and, on 11 February, John George Brew moved Battalion Headquarters to a new position. All too soon it would become apparent that their concerns were not unwarranted. On the British side of the front line, it was clear to the troops that they were now on a defensive footing. New reports of fresh German troops arriving on the Western Front were circulated almost daily and troops uneasily awaited the inevitable German offensive which they knew must arrive soon. From the 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary, it is clear that enemy activity of all types had massively increased. Artillery barrages of various sorts of ammunition soon became a daily occurrence, as was sniping and bombing from German aircraft.

Following the disbanding of the 7th/8th Irish Rifles, the 9th Irish Fusiliers received a draft of 9 officers and 213 other ranks on 16 February to bolster their numbers. Battalion strength now stood at 46 officers and 1066 other ranks. Upon Lieut.-Colonel Kelly's return from leave on 19 February, Major Brew went to a 3 day conference hosted by the Corps Commander, General Sir Ivor Maxse.

Though having her own problems of war-weariness at home, German morale had steadily grown with the unexpected Russian collapse and confidence took on new heights as troop strength increased in France. By March 1918, the number of German divisions on the Western Front had swelled to around 190, some 60 more than a year before, and continued to grow. The Allied armies were now becoming dangerously outnumbered and buoyed by this fact, General Ludendorff began to promise victory, but knew he would have to act fast with his new-found strength before the arrival of great numbers of American troops. Indeed, some 184,000 American troops were already in France by the end of January, and more were on there way. It was a great risk, certainly a race against time, and Ludendorff's strategists were planning an offensive of immense proportions.

Optimising Allied weaknesses, Ludendorff opted for a section of the front between Arras and St. Quentin, with the intention of dividing the Allied armies and forcing the British back to the Channel coast. His first and main strike, on the Somme, was code-named 'Michael', for which 74 Divisions, 6600 artillery pieces, 3500 mortars and 326 fighter aircraft would be deployed. Subsequent diversionary attacks, planned to confuse his enemy, were called 'St. George I' and 'St. George II' , against the British at Lys at Ypres respectively, and 'Blücher' against the French at Champagne. This far reaching plan was much greater than Allied commanders ever envisaged.

In the St. Quentin sector, the German 18th Army, under General Oskar von Hutier, fresh from the Eastern Front, planned it's attack on each side of St. Quentin, aiming to sever British lines and divide the British and French armies. Von Hutier's Army, headquartered at Guise, boasted 27 Divisions. To gain an impression of what this means, it is necessary to know that the average strength of a German Division in 1918 stood at 12,300 men, 3000 horses, 48 artillery pieces, 120 mortars, 78 heavy machine guns, 144 light machine guns, and 6-12 trucks.

The British Fifth Army commander, General Sir Hubert Gough, on the other hand, had at his disposal 12 Divisions, 1650 guns, and 119 tanks, and 357 aircraft. An average British division in 1918 consisted of 11,800 men, 3670 horses and mules, 48 artillery pieces, 36 mortars, 64 Vickers heavy machine guns, 144 Lewis light machine guns, 770 carts and wagons, 360 motorcycles and bicycles, 14 trucks and cars, and 21 motorised ambulances.

From 22 February onwards, the Ulster Division changed strategy and maintained a three brigade front, with the 108th on the right, the 107th in the centre, and 109th on the left. Each brigade kept one battalion on the front line in the forward zone, the second in support in the battle zone, some 6000 yards behind the front and protected by wired redoubts, and the third in reserve in the rear zone.

According to records in the 9th Irish Fusiliers War Diary, this system was continued until the onset of the German offensive. At 17:30 on 1 March 1918, for the purpose of illustration, the 9th Irish Fusiliers moved out of Essigny Station to relieve their colleagues of the 1st Irish Fusiliers, and spent the next several days working on defences in the battle zone. Their effective strength at the time was reported as 46 Officers, 1083 O.R.s, 36 horses, and 16 mules. After a number of days at the front, they moved back into reserve again, relieved by the 1st Fusiliers. At 18:00 on 7 March, the battalion relieved the 1st Irish Fusiliers on the front line once again, and found themselves positioned with the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles of the 107th Brigade to their left, and the 8th King's Royal Rifles to their right.

The main work of the Division throughout this period was improving defences, though some raiding was carried out to gauge the situation on the other side of No Man's Land. At 15:00 on 9 March, for example, 2nd Lieutenant W.G. Greenaway and 3 other ranks captured an enemy machine gun without opposition.

Over the following days, the activities of the 9th Fusiliers were described as being, "Patrolling and mining nightly. Our artillery lively cutting enemy wire and sweeping likely places of assembly for enemy attack. Enemy artillery unusually quiet. Great aerial activity owing to fine weather and visibility. One E.A. [Enemy Aeroplane] brought down on enemy line opposite left battalion front."
 

On the evening of 15 March, after 18:30, the 9th Fusiliers were relieved on the line by the 12th Irish Rifles, and moved back to Grand Seraucourt again, in reserve. Still concerned about discipline and orderliness, the Battalion commander's orders for the change-over demanded, "All dugouts will be left in a clean and sanitary condition and certificates to this effect will be obtained and forwarded to Battalion H.Q. by 12 noon, 16th. inst." By now, it had become clear the expected enemy offensive was imminent; Allied aircraft had successfully photographed German preparations behind their lines. New supply roads had been constructed and shell craters had been turned into concealed trench mortar batteries. Heavily laden motorised and horse-drawn transports had been seen heading into St. Quentin from the east, and in the distance German officers were observed studying British lines. The British answer was increased nightly bombardment of the German front lines, rear areas, and possible areas of troop assembly.

On Sunday, 17 March, the Division celebrated St. Patrick's Day with a Church Parade in the morning and sports in the evening. The 9th Fusiliers' effective strength was recorded that day as 45 Officers, 1058 O.R.s, 37 horses and 18 mules. From that evening on, noise of traffic from behind German lines was heard quite clearly by British troops in the forward trenches.

The following evening, two German deserters from Alsace, belonging to the 414th 'Minenwerfer' Company, came over No Man's Land to give themselves up to troops of the 107th Brigade, declaring their motive as wanting to avoid the coming offensive. The two confirmed Allied assumptions that the offensive was nigh; troops were massing on their front as were batteries of artillery and trench mortars. They reported 100 mortars directly in front of 36th Division lines for the purpose of cutting their wire. It would be accompanied by an artillery bombardment, lasting several hours, as a preliminary to an infantry assault. A number of German prisoners had already been taken which had provided valuable information to this effect, but the two Alsatians' reports were considered the most reliable yet. The information was passed on to Corps Headquarters and the Division scaled up their preparations for the offensive. The 9th Irish Fusiliers' War Diary describes their activities from 18 to 20 March as being intensive training during daylight hours with specialist training in the evening.

Just a few nights later, during the night of 20 March, troops of the 61st Division launched a raid on German positions and took more prisoners who gave up the vital fact that their offensive would be launched the following morning : The preparations for Ludendorff's Spring Offensive were by now in their final hours.

The German Army had spread itself along a 43 mile front between Arras, St. Quentin and La Fère. The XVIII Corps under Generalleutnant von Werern, confronted the 36th Division and the left of the 14th Division, to the north-west of their positions, on the southern side of St. Quentin. Two reserve infantry divisions were deployed on the German 3rd and rear trench line, an additional two divisions on the 2nd line and three divisions on the front line, consisting of the following troops :

1st Bavarian Division
36th Division
238th Division
1st Bavarian Regt. (Munich)

2nd Bavarian Regt. (Munich)

24th Bavarian Regiment
5th East Prussia Regiment

128th Danzig Regiment

175th Prussia Regiment
463rd Hansa Towns Regt.

464th Schleswig Regiment

465th Hanover Regiment
 

It is believed it was troops of the 238th Division's 463rd Hansa Towns Regiment which were facing the 108th Brigade trenches. The 238th Division was one of the youngest German Divisions having been raised and trained at Lockstedt, north of Hamburg, in early 1917. It was mostly made up of young men with birth years in 1898 and 1899, and some recovered wounded. The 238th had seen action already in a defensive roll in the Third Battle of Ypres, but the coming assault at St. Quentin would be their first offensive roll of the war.

In his book, "The Kaiser's Battle", Martin Middlebrook quotes many German soldiers' accounts and feelings during the lead-up to the battle. Despite overwhelming odds in their favour, it shows they still had reservations which were perhaps because of their lack of experience. One Leutnant Rudolf Hoffmann of the 463rd Hansa Towns Regiment, for example, commenting on the eve of the offensive, explained, "Most of the men were very quiet, some made a few jokes. One, I remember, took out a letter and a photograph of his wife and looked at it. He didn't say anything; they were all thinking of home. Possibly half of the men went to a quiet part of the trench and said their prayers. I too." The British reacted upon the information gained from the 61st's prisoners as soon as they could, but one could be forgiven for believing commanders had completely under-estimated what was awaiting them; their answer was merely to bombard German lines and likely areas of assembly for attack between 02:30 and 03:00. Before they could react, however, the Germans had already begun their own barrage. "02:00, Intensive enemy barrage opened on our positions for a depth of from 4-6 Kilometres."

The great offensive had arrived

The organisation of the Division along the front line had remained the same since the 22 February : The 108th Brigade on the right, the 107th in the centre, and the 109th on the left. The attack found the 12th Irish Rifles holding the 108th Brigade front line, followed by the 1st Irish Fusiliers in the trenches of the battle zone, and finally the 9th Irish Fusiliers in reserve. In the 107th's sector, the front was held by the 15th Irish Rifles, with the 1st Irish Rifles in the battle zone, and the 2nd Irish Rifles in reserve. In the 109th's sector, the front was held by the 2nd Inniskillings, the battle zone by the 1st Inniskillings in, and the 9th Inniskillings stayed in reserve.

At 04:35, a heavy German barrage opened up simultaneously on British front and rear positions with every weapon available to them. Trench mortars, mustard gas, chlorine gas, tear gas and smoke canisters were concentrated on the forward trenches, while heavy artillery bombarded rear areas and attempted to dispose of Allied artillery pieces and destroy supply lines. Troops, horses, transport and guns suffered heavily. It has been said that this was "one of the most furious and concentrated bombardments" of the entire war; few have matched it since.

Dawn broke to reveal a heavy morning mist. It has been recorded that by 05:00 visibility was barely 10 yards, and was extremely slow to dissipate throughout the morning. British communications were soon in shambles; telephone wires had been cut by artillery, and runners had a difficult time finding their way through the dense fog and heavy shelling. Their was much pandemonium and confusion. Forward positions could not relay or receive information to Battalion and Divisional Headquarters and communication with the artillery was cut. "At 6:00am enemy attacked. Bn. moved to Bde. H.Q. just east of village. 2Lt. Prenter and 4 ORs killed. 2Lt. Perkins and 16 Platoon missing. Part of 2 Platoons of A. Coy. missing." German troops advanced en-mass in gas masks behind a creeping barrage, using the fog as cover, and led by divisional 'storm troops' with heavy machine guns. Later reports place the time of infantry attack at 08:30, and the main thrust to the west of the Ulster Division, but confusion is hardly surprising under the circumstances.

The Division was overwhelmed by the onslaught of German Infantry and recoiled under the might of the massive push. Along with all other British troops on the front, they were driven back faster than they believed possible. As the day progressed, breakthroughs of successive lines of British trenches were reported continuously. The push was gaining momentum and German troops were moving faster than British Artillery could reel in their range. Many barrages landed uselessly behind the unremitting advance.

Around midday, a major breakthrough in the 14th Division's lines, to the right of the 36th's sector, meant that German troops were already in the battle zone. This became an immediate and dangerous threat to the 36th. Before long, German troops were in Essigny, and beating on the 108th Brigade's right flank. The 1st Irish Fusiliers turned to meet them and the 9th Irish Fusiliers were sent in to defend the exposed flank but by 14:30, German troops were already 1½ miles south of Essigny. The entire forward zone had by now been captured and the enormity of the German attack began to become quite clear. General Gough, however, was still having problems convincing his own commanders of the gravity of the situation.

Meanwhile, the 108th's 12th Irish Rifles, despite all that was thrown against it, put up stubborn resistance and held on longer than almost any other British unit, despite several direct attacks on their trenches, which at times involved bitter hand-to-hand fighting and attacks with flame throwers. Each time, the Germans were ejected from the 12th Rifles' trenches. But then, soon after midday, the fog lifted and revealed to their horror the extent of the breakthrough - German soldiers could be seen a mile behind them! By this time the Rifles were being attacked from the front and both flanks; they were virtually surrounded, and quite clearly outnumbered. They decided the best course of action was to retreat, but by 16:00, the situation had become so hopeless that they realised their only option was surrender. Some 100 men, many of whom were wounded, destroyed their rifles and gave themselves up to avoid senseless slaughter. In the confusion of the battle, no-one was aware of their gallant stand, and it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of their delaying action, but, following the war, the unit was awarded two DCMs, one MC, and four MMs for the episode.

Meanwhile, the rest of the 108th Brigade was ordered to form a defensive flank half way between Essigny and Lizerolles, and the 9th Inniskillings of the 109th formed up behind the 9th Irish Fusiliers' positions in support, where the front remained steady until dusk. The oncoming darkness gave the Germans the opportunity to bring up reinforcements, which began assembling for the next onslaught. During this, the fighting continued elsewhere; 17:30 the positions held by the remnants of the 15th Rifles' (107th Brigade) and 2nd Inniskillings' (109th Brigade) were surrendered and captured, following the earlier fall of the 108th's 12th Rifles around 16:00.

That evening, both the 9th and 1st Irish Fusiliers fell back to between Artemps and Tugny-et-Pont, until they were ordered to withdraw further around 22:30. They moved a short distance north-west to Happencourt, while General Nugent moved Divisional Headquarters to Estouilly, just north-east of Ham. As they retreated across bridges over the Canal de la Somme, they were blown up by the Division's Engineers and the Ulstermen spent the night behind the fragile interim barrier.

"Serious losses had been sustained. In addition to losing three battalions of the Forward Zone, the three battalions in the Battle Zone were reduced to 250 men each; only the three reserve battalions were at reasonable strength. The fighting strength of the division now numbered less than 3000 men." In post war analysis, it has been calculated that 2392 men of the Ulster Division had been taken prisoner alone on the first day of battle. As for the roll of the Royal Flying Corps, the morning fog had delayed the effective use of aircraft but, by the end of the day, 36 squadrons had been in action and reported losing 16 aircraft and crew, while having shot down 14 enemy. The Germans for their part reported respectively 19 and 8.

The following day was spent in aggressive fighting across the Canal. The Germans brought heavy artillery into Artemps under the cover of morning mist which duly forced the remaining battalions of the 109th to retreat to join the 108th at Happencourt. General Nugent's commanders decided to form a new line of defence on the south of the Canal de St. Quentin, requiring the Division to withdraw to Sommette, which it did by escaping over the Canal at Dury. It has been said, however, that the decision to withdraw during daylight over a distance of almost 9 miles, requiring severe fighting and losses, was actually the result of a misunderstanding between Generals Gough and Maxse. It would be later seen in analysis as a foolhardy and unnecessary surrender of a vital position.

The 107th took up new positions in Eucourt and Cugny, the 109th behind them in support in Brouchy, while the 1st and 9th Irish Fusiliers of the 108th took up positions on the Division's left flank on the Canal's bank. The move was completed by 23:00 and the 36th, with newly attached remnants of other divisions, held a line of about 5 miles length between 1 mile west of Sommette and 1½ miles north-west of Jussy, where they were rejoined by their Divisional Artillery which had been in action with the 20th Division during the day. Divisional Headquarters was also relocated to Fréniches, several miles to the south-west.

The Engineers arrived in late, having been busy blowing all the bridges across the Canal between Ham and Ollézy, although it would soon be revealed that the railway bridge at Pithon had failed to be destroyed; the minor damage done by French Railway Troops was hastily repaired by troops of the German No.3 Foot Guard Regiment, and the Germans were soon crossing in great numbers.

Early next morning, Saturday 23 March, German troops succeeded in forcing a breakthrough of the line in the 14th Division's sector on the Canal at Jussy, opening the way south, and the leak could not be plugged. German troops surged south, having crossed the Canal at many points already by 11:15, and the British were soon in full retreat again. All lines of defence had now been overcome. There was nothing left to stop the German advance and bitter fighting over open country ensued. There was little rest for British troops; those who were not fighting were beating a retreat.

The 16th Irish Rifles were put under the command of the 9th Irish Fusiliers and spent the entire day in action. In the evening, they retreated from a German push on the left flank and spent a relatively quiet night at a farm house outside Villeselve. During that day, along the Division's front, Aubigny, Brouchy, Cugny and Eaucourt had been lost.

In the early hours of 24 March, before dawn, German troops entered Golancourt, just north-west of Villeselve, foiling a planned counter-offensive by the 109th before it was launched. The Brigade's attack was cancelled and the troops remained in their defensive positions. The front at this time ran roughly between Cugny and the south of Golancourt. Fierce fighting continued through the morning along the entire front and at 11:00 the remnants of the Division were ordered to withdraw further south to the town of Guiscard. Gaps in the front created by the staggered withdrawal were utilised by advancing Germans and the Division's sector of the line collapsed. Being attacked now from both the north-east and north-west, they fell back into Villeselve, but were heavily bombed by German Artillery from around 12:00. British troops, backed up by French infantry attempted to hold the line here, but when the French received their own orders to retreat, the British had no choice but to go with them, and fell back through Berlancourt to Guiscard. During the move, German Artillery levelled barrages on both of these towns.

At 23:00, the Division's remaining troops were placed under the command of the French 62nd Division, and ordered to retreat, filtering back through their lines. The remains of the 9th Irish Fusiliers were left as rearguard on the ridge between Berlancourt and Guiscard during the night where Captain Partridge was killed and Captain Vasey wounded, while the rest of the Division retired to Sermaize and Frétoy-le-Château to get some rest.

The movements of the 25 March were extremely confused and reports from different battalions and divisions contradict one another often. The remaining troops of the Ulster Division were ordered to withdraw and reorganise, maintaining a support for French troops now holding the front, and commenced a 15 mile march west. Around midday, they halted for a few hours rest near Avricourt. While there they received orders to head for a new line which would be formed between Bouchoir and Guerbigny.

That day, the German Army picked up the pace of their advance and pressed forward at an alarming pace, covered many miles. Allied troops and civilians with laden carts and wagons filled the roads streaming south and west. The Germans passed through Libermont, and over the Canal du Nord. Further north, the town of Nesle was captured, while to the south west of Libermont German troops soon faced the French along the Noyon-Roye road.

Most of the Ulster Division had arrived in their new lines around 02:00 on 26 March, and were able to sleep around six hours, the longest continuous sleep they had had since the beginning of the offensive began, some six days before. Within a few short hours, while they slept, German troops entered and occupied Roye.

Meanwhile, the 9th Irish Fusiliers were a long way behind the rest of the Division, delayed by their action north of Guiscard the night before. Their retreat was a 30 mile continuous night march from Guiscard to Erches, their designated position at the centre of the new line, along the Guerbigny-Bouchoir road. They route-marched through Bussy to Avricourt, then on to Tilloloy, Popincourt, Grivillers, Marquivillers, and finally via Guerbigny to Erches, where they arrived, completely exhausted, around 11:00 on 26 March.

German troops were never far behind. Having taken Roye during the early hours of the morning, they continued to advance on the Bouchoir-Guerbigny line. By mid-morning, they were in Andechy, just 3½ miles away, although advance parties were already making their first contact with the new defences and meeting resistance.

The Ulstermen had established themselves along the line in Brigade order, from left to right, the 107th, the 108th and the 109th, having occupied the remains of old French trenches from 1916. With additional support from the 30th Division in Bouchoir and the 122nd Field Company, the 36th's Lewis Guns formed a formidable barrier which succeeded in holding back repeated German attacks. Gradually, German troops began to reach the line in greater strength and by 13:00, a great battle was in progress. In the 9th Irish Fusiliers' lines, "Major BREW & details went into line in front of ERCHES. Remainder of Bn. under Capt. Despard (M.C.) formed reserves W. of ERCHES."
 

The Division put up excellent resistance and fought off many direct attacks. However, the Germans soon realised the Division had no artillery to support them, and it was only a matter of time before they brought forward their own; around dusk they commenced bombardment of Erches. It was followed by a concentrated infantry attack and by 20:00, German troops had forced their way into the town, severing the Ulster Division's line. Then, during the evening, a sudden and rash series of events brought John George Brew's war to an unexpected end. One account records the incident as follows:

"During the action, a serious loss occurred when a motor car with the GSO1 of the divisional staff drove into a German patrol and its occupants were captured. They included Col. Place, the CO of the 1st Irish Fusiliers, Lt. Col. Furnell, and A/CO of 9th Irish Fusiliers Major Brew, all of whom were returning from a conference."
While returning to his lines with other Officers after obtaining permission for a further retreat, he was driven directly into advancing German soldiers. A German bullet stopped the car's engine and the officers jumped out ready for a fight, but the Germans were upon them before they could react. A couple of them were wounded and the little group had no choice but to surrender. So it was to be here in Erches, on 26 March 1918, that Major John George Brew was to fight his final battle. The details surrounding the incident remained vague until a few years after the war, though several days later, the Battalion Casualty Report noted dryly,

"Major BREW, J.G...Missing (Believed wounded) 26.3.18".
 

It had been a costly retreat to Erches, both in land and lives. The haste of the withdrawal and the ferocity of the German attack had cost the 9th Irish Fusiliers officers ranks 2 killed in action, 6 wounded, 1missing believed wounded, accounting for John George Brew, and 14 missing. John George would appear to be the highest ranking casualty of the 9th Irish Fusiliers for the period. Of the Other Ranks, 15 were killed in action, 75 wounded, 1 wounded and missing, and 406 missing. How many of the Battalion's 420 missing were actually wounded or killed was at that time anyone's guess.

For the remaining troops, it was to be a long night in the trenches under heavy bombardment by the German artillery. British lines of supply were broken and no ammunition, food or water reached the front. At dawn, the Germans attacked again. To the right of their section of the front, the French retreated. To save being trapped, the 109th Brigade moved back with them. The result was the immediate capture of Guerbigny, which posed an instant threat to the 108th Brigade isolated at Erches. The remnants of the 108th then bore the full brunt of the German attack, having failed to receive an order to withdraw. They battled on under incredulous odds until shortly after 11:00 by which time they were virtually annihilated and finally overrun. It has been said that only one officer and nineteen other ranks came away alive.

The remainder of the 107th and 109th Brigades continued to fall back, but the last troops of the 15th Irish Rifles still held on until around midday, before withdrawing towards Arvillers, and meeting what was left of the 1st and 2nd Irish Rifles on the way. The three Battalions together numbered not more than half a company, and in Arvillers, these three officers and 60 men held the line until they were finally relieved by the French on the morning of 28 March. They were the last of the 36th Division to be removed from what was to become known as the "Battle of St. Quentin".

"The exhausted remnants entrained for Europe via Gamache on the Channel coast. The Ulster Division, on arrival in France needed a fleet of trains to move them to the Somme area; now, only one was required to take them away. I doubt if the whole Division could produce more than the equivalent of a full battalion..."
The 108th's ranks barely numbered 300 men following the battle, and the Division's casualties for the ten days following the offensive's opening day on 21 March stood at 7252, of which 185 officers and 5659 other ranks were reported as missing. Among the officers ranks, 127 were reported killed or wounded.

By this time, despite less than satisfying results on his other fronts, Ludendorff's troops, advancing from the original front at St. Quentin, had penetrated some 40 miles deep into British lines and had reached Montdidier. Ludendorff claimed 80,000 Allied prisoners and the capture of 975 guns. Total British casualties in those few days stood at a staggering 300,000. He bathed in his success, but his over-optimism led him to miscalculate his and his enemy's next moves; he failed to adequately follow up and the Allied forces, bolstered by the arrival of 12 divisions of American troops, repelled his march to the Channel coast and brought it to a grinding halt.

Although they did not fully realise it at the time, this was, at last, the turn of tide which the Allied armies had so long awaited. It was the beginning of the end; something for which they had prayed, but closer than they dared dream. Back in Portadown, late that month, John George's wife Annie's worst fears were realised when a telegram from the War Office arrived stating, "To Mrs. Brew Rathlin Portadown Regret inform you Major JG Brew Irish Fusiliers reported missing believed wounded twenty-six March no details". It would be another month before Annie would hear from the War Office again when she received a second telegram informing her, "Major J.G. Brew, Royal Irish Rifles, is now reported missing believed prisoner of war on March 26th".
She tried to console herself with the fact that as a prisoner, John had probably survived the war. But on 25 May 1918, an unexpected letter shattered Annie's hopes; it brought crushing news.

"The Military Secretary presents his compliments to Mrs. Brew and deeply regrets to inform her that in a casualty list sent from the Front by the German Military Authorities to the Frankfurt Red Cross, and which has been forwarded to the War Office, it is stated that Major J.G. Brew, 9/R. Irish Fusiliers, who was reported missing on the 26th March, 1918, died at 4.p.m. on 6/4/18 from shot wound lung. Buried at the southern outskirts of Hattencourt [sic] in a separate Grave No.64".
John George's Army Service Record shows the report which was received from the German Red Cross in German. It was correctly and fully translated without error. The War Office followed up their May letter with another on 6 June confirming,

"In view of this report the Army Council are regretfully constrained to conclude that Major Brew Died of Wounds received in action, as a Prisoner of War in German hands, on 6th April 1918. I am to express their sympathy to you in your bereavement". Comforting, it was not.

The circumstances surrounding John George's capture and death were, however, to remain a mystery for several years and Annie Brew's grief was only deepened by the unknown. Though she had attempted to find out what had occurred, it was not until a full three years after his death that she would obtain the answer, when she received a letter dated 6 April 1921 - ironically three years to the day - from Colonel M. J. Furnell. It read, "Col. Fitzgerald was speaking to me yesterday and asked me to write to you what I knew about your husband's death in 1918, as I was with him at the time.

As you probably know your husband and I were commanding the 9th and 1st Bn's of the Regiment and on the evening of the 27th I think it was [it was actually the evening of the 26th], our two Battalions were holding a position in some old trenches where we had been heavily attacked all day and we had decided to withdraw both our Battalions at dark. We went to tell the General who was on our right what our intentions were, when the General Staff Officer No 1, Col Green of the Ulster Division, arrived and said he would take your husband and myself to see our own Brigadier in his motor; we went and saw the Brigadier but upon returning in the motor, drove into an advance party of the Germans who opened fire and bombed the car. Col Green was wounded and we were all captured. After being searched we were being marched back to the German Headquarters by an escort, when some Germans who evidently mistook us for British troops opened fire on us; your husband was walking alongside me and was hit.

I ran over towards the men who were firing thinking they were our own troops as things were rather mixed up and it was dark. However, I discovered they were Bosche as they fired at me when I was a few yards from them. I then went back to your husband who was lying on the road. I found he had been hit through the lung and as Col Green and the motor driver were already wounded it was impossible to move him without help from the Bosche which they refused to give and only beat us with the butts of their rifles when we asked them to move your husband.

We moved him to the side of the road and made him as comfortable as possible, he couldn't speak much, the Bosche were trying to hurry us on all the time so [I] didn't have much chance of doing anything and said goodbye to your husband and he was able to shake hands with me. When we reached German Headquarters Col Green who spoke German told the German Commanding Officer about your husband and they told him they would send out for him but one can never believe a Bosche.

There was one of our doctors also a prisoner and I asked him about your husband. He said the best thing that could happen was for him to remain where he was as it was a frosty night and that might stop the bleeding. I never heard what happened to your husband afterwards and I didn't meet anyone who had met him in a German hospital but heard when I was released that he had died. I had met your husband many times in 1917-18 and was very sorry indeed when I heard he had died. I was afraid at the time it was a bad wound."
John George left his widow, Annie, and 2 children, 9 year old John Kenneth and 7 year old Marion, in Portadown, County Armagh, Northern Ireland. His death is recorded in the "Army Officers War Records of Deaths 1914-1921", and reads simply, "Name and Rank - John George Brew Temp. Maj., Unit - 9th Bn. R. Ir. Fus., Died of Wounds 6.4.1918 Outskirts of Hatton Court ."
He is buried in Roye New British Cemetery, outside the town of Roye, 40km south-east of Amiens, in Picardy, France. New British Cemetery contains some 417 graves of Allied soldiers gathered from temporary graves in surrounding areas, most of whom were either German prisoners of war or died during the retreat of March 19.

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